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E-voting  is  highly  suspicious  to many  citizens  and  institutions.  Past  pilot
implementations  ended  before  Supreme  Courts  and  mostly  not  in favour
of e-voting. Beside these political and legal battles regarding e-voting, postal voting
seems  to be  commonly  accepted  and  not  in question.  Motivated  by a landmark
ruling of the Austrian Constitutional Court in 2016,1 which led to the revocation
of the run-off  elections result  due to irregularities with postal  voting, this paper
analyses  whether  current  postal  voting  regulations  and  standards  in Germany
comply  to the principles  established  by the latest  Council  of Europe  (CoE)
recommendation on standards for e-voting. Both voting channels are channels for
remote  voting,  hence  principles  established  for  one  channel  must,  in the view
of the author,  also  be  fully  applicable  for  the other  channel.  This  paper  applies
the standards  set  by the recommendation  to e-voting  to the more  commonly  used
remote voting channel postal  voting and concludes that  most of these standards
cannot be met.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Council of Europe (CoE) in 2004 issued a recommendation Rec(2004)11
which  was  until  2017,  in the absence  of any  regulations  in most
of the national  constitutions  on e-voting,  the yardstick  to decide  whether
any e-voting did meet democratic standards. Due to technical progress and
a significant  number  of e-voting  pilots  in many  member  states
of the Council  of Europe,  the recommendation  was  updated  in 2017.
The main consideration can be found in the preamble: 
“Aware  of concerns  about  potential  security,  reliability  or transparency
problems of e-voting systems”.2
These  concerns  exist,  especially  after  several  bad  experiences  with
e-voting, namely:
● The Austrian  Constitutional  Court  annulled  an election  where
e-voting was used for the first (and last) time in Austria in 2009;3
● The Finnish  Supreme  Administrative  Court  annulled  election
results  and  ordered  the elections  to be  repeated  paper-based
after a failed e-voting;4
● Several  disappointing  reports  on e-voting  pilots  at municipal
elections  in the UK  published  by the Electoral  Commission
in 2007;5
2 Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on standards for
e-voting. Council of Europe, p. 2.
3 Verfassungsgerichtshof, V 85-96/11-15, 13 December 2011. [online] Available from: https://www.
vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_V_85-96-11_e-voting.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2018].
4 Decision KHO:2009:39 (687/1/09),  Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, 9 April 2009.
[online]. Available  from:  https://www.finlex.fi/fi/oikeus/kho/vuosikirjat/2009/200900899
[Accessed  2 November  2018];  EFFI  (Electronic  Frontier  Finland). A Report  on the Finnish
E-voting Pilot. [online] Available from: https://www.verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/Finland-2008-EFFI-Report.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2018].
5 Actica Consulting.  Technical Evaluation of Sheffield  City Council e-voting Pilot 2007.  [online]
Available  from:  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commis
sion_pdf_file/0020/16193/Actica_Sheffield_27247-20138__E__N__S__W__.pdf  [Accessed  31
May 2018]; Actica Consulting.  Summary of Technical Assessments of May 2007 e-voting Pilots.
[online] Available  from:  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_
commission_pdf_file/0018/16191/Actica_Summary_27244-20136__E__N__S__W__.pdf
[Accessed 31 May 2018]; Actica Consulting. Technical Evaluation of Swindon Borough Council
e-voting Pilot 2007. [online] Available from: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/
assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0005/16196/Actica_Swindon_27245-20141__E__N__S_
_W__.pdf  [Accessed  31  May  2018];  Actica  Consulting.  Technical  Evaluation  of Rushmoor
Borough  Council  e-voting  Pilot  2007.  [online] Available  from:  http://www.electoralcommis
sion.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0019/16192/Actica_Rushmoor_272
48-20137__E__N__S__W__.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2018].
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● Norway cancelled before usage.6
Setting aside the technical issues, which are not the focus of this paper,
it  is  obvious  that  e-voting7 and  postal  voting  are  two  different  voting
channels for remote voting. If a renowned and distinguished institution like
the Council  of Europe  defines  requirements  a remote  voting  channel  A
must meet, it seems obvious that voting channel B must meet them at least
in principle, otherwise one channel is not as reliable as the other, so in legal
terminology:  preferred.  If,  for  instance  the recommendation  on e-voting
requires that 
“The voter shall receive confirmation by the system that the vote has been
cast successfully and that the whole voting procedure has been completed,”8 
the question  arises  whether  postal  voting  also  complies  with  this
requirement. 
It does not make much sense to require a new remote voting channel,
namely  e-voting,  to fulfil  requirements  an established  remote  voting
channel,  namely  postal  voting  does  not  fulfil,  not  even at a much  lower
level. 
The paper  consists  of a commented  listing  of some  key  requirements
of the recommendation  in Section  2,  which  includes  an analysis
as to whether  these  requirements  are  met  by postal voting  in Germany.
Section  3  summarizes  in brief,  what  immediate  changes  to postal  voting
must  become  effective,  to meet  this  requirements.  Section  4  opens
the discussion,  whether  it  seems  acceptable  to permit  one  remote  voting
channel  to be  preferred  over  another  and  what  conclusions  should  be
drawn.
The paper  intends  to start  a discussion  on legal,  process  and technical
issues associated with postal voting. 
Regarding  the scientific  literature  on this  topic,  there  are  only  a few
sources,  most  of them  quoted  in the paper.  In Germany,  election  fraud
in general  and  issues  of remote  voting  in particular  are  not  discussed.
Standard  textbooks  dealing  with  elections,  like  e.g. Nohlen,  contain  just
6 BBC News. (2014) E-voting Experiments End in Norway Amid Security Fears. 27 June. [online]
Available  from:  https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28055678  [Accessed  4 November
2018].
7 E-voting in this paper means voting via the Internet. 
8 Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on standards for
e-voting. Council of Europe, p. 4.
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a few sentences  on postal  voting and e-voting within  a 588-page-volume9
without raising any issues. Ritter and Niehuss, who provide the analyses for
elections after 1945, also fail to raise the issue of fraud.10 Finally, what may
arguably  be  the German  standard  textbook  on Election  Research,
Falter/Schoen fails  to include  a single  line  on election  fraud or issues  with
remote  voting.  The index  does  not  even contain  the  word  “Wahlbetrug”,
which  means  election  fraud.11 The  standard  legislative  commentary
on the German election law contains only one minor remark in the context
of postal voting, which is referred to later in the text.
2. KEY REQUIREMENTS ON E-VOTING DERIVED FROM 
THE CM/REC(2017)5
The requirements,  called standards in CoE-terminology,  are grouped into
thematic sections from I to VIII. Of course, they are focused on e-voting, but
at least  in principle  they must  be  applicable  to any other  form of remote
voting.
2.1 UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
The standards here  are  fully  applicable  to e-voting,  but  do not  raise  any
issues except for Standard 3:
“Unless channels of remote e-voting are universally accessible, they shall be
only an additional and optional means of voting.”
If we consider an election like the  “Sozialwahl” in Germany, where people
elect  representatives  in Social  Security  Councils,  this  election  takes  place
in one  channel  only:  postal  voting.12 The question  arises  as to what
“universally  accessible” means.  The Explanatory  Memorandum  gives  us
the answer:
9 Nohlen,  D.  (2014)  Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem – Zur Theorie  und Empirie  der Wahlsysteme.
7.,  überarbeitete  und  aktualisierte  Auflage.  Lizenzausgabe  für  die Bundeszentrale  für
politische Bildung, Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen/Toronto, p. 46.
10 Ritter, G. A. and Niehuss, M. (1991) Wahlen in Deutschland 1946–1991, C.H. Beck, München;
Ritter, G. A. and Niehuss, M. (1995) Wahlen in Deutschland 1991–1994, C.H. Beck, München.
11 Falter,  J.  W.  and  Schoen  H.  (2014)  Handbuch  Wahlforschung. 2.,  überarbeitete  Auflage.
Springer VS, Wiesbaden, p. 891.
12 The “Sozialwahl” has  an electorate  of some  51  mio.  People  (see  Soziale  Selbstverwaltung.
[online]  Available  from: https://www.sozialwahl.de/sozialwahl/die-sozialwahl-auf-einen-
blick/ [Accessed 31 May 2018]).
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“However,  offering  the remote  e-voting  channel  exclusively  restricts
accessibility,  given  the fact  that  the channel,  namely  internet,  is  not
universally accessible for the time being. This provision aims at protecting
the voter so that he or she is offered a means of voting which is effectively
available to him or to her.”13
Unfortunately postal voting is not universally accessible as Müller-Török
and  Pautsch have  pointed  out.14 There  are  severe  differences  between
different states of the world in delivery times and delivery methods, which
are  not  taken  into  account  by today’s  German  postal  voting  regime.
Registered  mail  with  delivery  to the identified  addressee  only  is  not
available in e.g. Argentine, Brazil, Chile, China and India while the delivery
time  indications  are  between  10  and  18  working  days.15 This,  due
to the time-limits  in the law,  effectively  hinders  any  postal  voting.  These
issues,  as Pautsch  and  Müller-Török discussed,  lead  to a situation  where  it
depends  on stochastic  terms  whether  a postal  ballot  finds  its  voter  and
the way  back  within  the timeframe  stipulated  by the election  procedures
and laws and whether it is counted or not. The oversea voters do not have
another  channel  than  postal  voting –  because  it  is  unthinkable  that
e.g. a German citizen  residing  in Hawaii  will  fly  to San  Francisco  to vote
at the competent German Consulate – at his or her own expense. So at least
with  a view  on the overseas  ballot,16 postal  voting  does  not  meet
the requirement raised by the recommendation. In the literature on German
elections there is in only one single publication concern raised with a view
to privatization of domestic postal services, but the issue of overseas voters
13 Explanatory  Memorandum  to Recommendation  CM/Rec(2017)5  of the Committee  of Ministers
to member States on standards for e-voting. Document Number CM(2017)50-add1final. Council
of Europe, p. 6.
14 Pautsch,  A.  and  Müller-Török,  R.  (2015)  Die grenzüberschreitende  Zustellung
von Briefwahlunterlagen  vor den Schranken  des Völkerrechts –  Eine  übersehene
Problematik?.  Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik,  3, pp. 88-90, p. 89; Müller-Török, R. and Pautsch,
A.  (2015)  Stochastische  Verfälschungen  von Wahlergebnissen  bei grenzüberschreitender
Briefwahl?. Verwaltung und Management, 4, pp. 192-197, p. 196; Prosser, A., Pautsch, A. and
Müller-Török,  R.  Legal  Aspects  of Cross-Border  Delivery  of Voting  Documents –
A Neglected  Issue?.  In:  Proceedings  of the 2015  2nd  International  Conference  on Electronic
Governance and Open Society: Challenges in Eurasia, ACM New York NY 2015, pp. 123. 
15 For  the delivery  time  estimates  see  Länderinformationen  und  internationale  Brieflaufzeiten.
[online]  Available  from:  https://www.deutschepost.de/de/b/briefe-ins-ausland/laender
informationen.html;  a timely return of the postal ballot cannot be guaranteed such within
the deadlines set by the electoral laws and authorities.
16 In the days  before  the Bavarian  Federal  State  Assembly  Elections,  which  took  place
on October 14th, 2018, a doctor’s prescription needed five full days to be delivered within
the City of Munich from a General Practitioner to the author. This may sound anecdotic, but
raises serious questions in the context of postal voting. 
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is totally neglected.17 And, with a view on the above mentioned “Sozialwahl”
it does in no way meet this requirement.
2.2 EQUAL SUFFRAGE
Standard 7 states:
“Unique  identification  of voters  in a way  that  they  can  unmistakably  be
distinguished from other persons shall be ensured.”
This  standard  seems,  at first  glance,  to be  fulfilled  by postal  voting
in Germany,  but  with  a view  to the two  explanatory  notes,  it  becomes
ambiguous:
“The voters'  registers  therefore  need  to provide  means  to avoid  digital
twins –  i.e. persons  holding  the same  identification  data.  In cases  where
central  voters’  registers are used, unique identification may implicitly be
given by the entry of the person in the database. With interconnected voters'
registers additional means may be necessary.”
In Germany the voters’ registers are decentralized, but not interconnected.
If we take Baden-Württemberg for  example,  the provisions  in § 10 GemO
state  that  the mayor  of each  municipality  may  keep  the voter  register
in an electronic  manner – but  he is  not legally obliged to.  No mandatory
formal  checks  for  duplicates  over  community  boundaries  takes  place.
The very same appears for the elections to the European Parliament, where
Balthasar and Müller-Török have shown that no reconciliation over Member
States  boundaries  takes  place,18 despite  legal  requirements  in European
Union law.19
17 Schreiber, W.; Hahlen, J. and Strelen, K.-L. (2017) BWahlG Kommentar zum Bundeswahlgesetz
unter Einbeziehung des Wahlprüfungsgesetzes,  des Wahlstatistikgesetzes, der Bundeswahlordnung
und sonstiger wahlrechtlicher Nebenvorschriften. 10., vollständig neubearbeitete Auflage. Carl
Heymanns Verlag, p. 614.
18 In Germany,  there  was  the  famous  case  of Giovanni  di Lorenzo,  a renowned  newspaper
journalist, who voted twice in 2014 with his Italian and German passport on the Italian and
German  ballot.  Charges  against  him  were  dropped  after  he  agreed  to pay  a fine
(see Die Welt. (2014) Verfahren gegen “Zeit“ – Chef di Lorenzo eingestellt.  18 November.
[online]  Available  from:   https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article134483671/
Verfahren-gegen-Zeit-Chef-di-Lorenzo-eingestellt.html [Accessed 1 September 2018]).
19 Balthasar,  A.  and  Müller-Török,  R.  Ein Vorschlag  zur Effektuierung  des Artikels  13
der Richtlinie  93/109/EG.  In:  Tagungsband  des 14. Internationalen  Rechtsinformatik
Symposions – IRIS 2011, 24.–26. Februar 2011, Salzburg.
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Standard 8 states:
“The e-voting  system shall  only  grant  a user  access  after  authenticating
her/him as a person with the right to vote,”
and looks,  at first  glance,  not  applicable  for postal  voting.  The respective
explanatory note says:
“In cases  where  anonymous  voting  tokens  prove  that  a voter  is  eligible
to vote, identification of the voter may not be required at this point as it has
already taken  place  at an earlier  stage,  namely  when the specific  token  is
assigned to a specific voter.”
The postal  ballot is  definitely  an anonymous voting token in the meaning
of the recommendation.  Here  a major  question  arises:  Was  the  voter
identified  before he  was  handed  over  the postal  ballot  by the postman?
Unfortunately,  the application  for  postal  voting  in Germany  consists
of three steps, which do not require much identification as shown below:
1. The voter  receives  a postcard  or letter  by non-registered  mail
in his  or her  mailbox,  which  enables  him  or her  to require
a postal  ballot.  This  can  be  done  without  the postcard/letter,
even by plain fax or e-mail,20 in this case jump step 2;
2. The voter  ticks  a box,  signs  the postcard  or letter  and  sends  it
to his  or her  Election  Authority.  Note  that  an address  different
from  the voter’s  address  in the voter  roll  can  be  stated.
The postal  ballot  is  sent  to this  new  address  without  further
inquiries;
3. The Election  Authority  sends  the postal  ballot  to the address
stated on the request with non-registered mail.21
As Stein and Müller-Török have shown, a signature is a non-secure proof
of identity in an election context, because it is expensive to verify and leads
to a less-than-100 percent level of likelihood that the person who signed is
20 The Federal  Returning  Officer  suggests  this  at his  website  when  explaining  the process
of postal voting  (see  Briefwahl.  [online]  Available from: https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/
bundestagswahlen/2017/informationen-waehler/briefwahl.html#967be3c2-d7a4-46c4-8d77-
1784f3fce9f2 [Accessed 1 September 2018]).
21 The only occasions in the life of the author in Germany (1997–2018), where a postal ballot
was sent by registered mail with a mandatory proof of identity were when receiving his
ballots  for  the Austrian  Parliamentary  and  Presidential  Elections.  For  German  elections
the ballots were never sent registered mail nor had he to proof his identity to postmen.
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the person in question.22 A mailbox is,  because  of the lack of standardized
and  lockable  mailboxes  in Germany,  not  a safe  place.  It  is  easy  to get
an envelope  out  of a mailbox  without  a key,  because  no  legal  provision
requires  mailboxes  to hinder  third-party  access.  In Austria,  on the other
hand, § 34 PMG requires:
“The mailbox  must  be  such  that  postal  shipments  are  protected  against
third-party access by an appropriate protection” (my translation).
In Germany,  there  was  a major  case  of election  fraud  regarding
applications for postal voting at a local election. A farmer in Bavaria filled
in hundreds  of such  request  forms  for  her  Romanian  farmhands  and
managed  to submit  the postal  ballots.  Election  authorities  nullified
the election and the criminal lawsuit is still pending.23 
It  is  obvious  that  this  protocol  is  not  safe  against  misuse.  Also
the standard  legislative  commentary  acknowledges  these  shortcomings,
namely:
● A postal  ballot  can  easily  be  requested  by third  parties
in the name of the voter;
● The possibility  of stating  a different  address  the ballot  shall  be
sent to;
● All documents included can easily be forged or copied;
● Issues  with  elderly  or (mentally)  disabled  people  in nursing
homes.24
Standard 9 requires that only the appropriate number of votes per voter
is  cast,  stored  and  counted.  “One  person,  one  vote”  is  mentioned
in the explanatory  note  but,  in the opinion  of the author,  violated  in one
22 Stein, R. and Müller-Török, R. (2010) Die Europäische Bürgerinitiative aus Sicht nationaler
Wahlbehörden:  Probleme  der Verifikation  von Unterstützungserklärungen  in der Praxis.
Verwaltung und Management, 5, pp. 255–262.
23 Landgericht  Regensburg.  (2018)  Strafverfahren  wegen  Verdachts  der Wahlmanipulation
in Geiselhöring.  [press  release] 15  October.  Available  from:  https://www.justiz.bayern.de/
gerichte-und-behoerden/landgericht/regensburg/presse/2018/7.php  [Accessed  2 November
2018].  The assumption  of innocence  is  not  applicable;  because  the election  was  already
nullified  by the election  authority  (see  Die Welt.  (2014)  Bayerischer  Kreis  muss  wegen
Fälschung neu  wählen.  2  October.  [online]  Available  from: https://www.welt.de/politik/
deutschland/article132875498/Bayerischer-Kreis-muss-wegen-Faelschung-neu-waehlen.
html [Accessed 2 November 2018]). 
24 Schreiber, W.; Hahlen, J. and Strelen, K.-L. (2017) BWahlG Kommentar zum Bundeswahlgesetz
unter Einbeziehung des Wahlprüfungsgesetzes,  des Wahlstatistikgesetzes, der Bundeswahlordnung
und sonstiger wahlrechtlicher Nebenvorschriften. 10., vollständig neubearbeitete Auflage. Carl
Heymanns Verlag, p. 613.
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special  situation:  If the voter  dies  before  election  day,  he  or she  can
of course not vote at the polling station but his or her postal vote cast before
his or her dying day and well before election day is counted if mailed. This
may sound irrelevant at the first glance, but if you consider narrow results
in a constituency and some 20 days between receiving postal  ballots and
Election Day this may well become relevant.25 At least it seems obvious, that
voters cannot be treated equally dependent of the voting channel chosen.
2.3 FREE SUFFRAGE
Standard 15 to 17 are the most crucial requirements when they are applied
to existing postal voting. 15 states:
“The voter  shall  be  able  to verify  that  his  or her  intention  is  accurately
represented  in the vote  and that  the sealed  vote  has  entered the electronic
ballot  box without  being altered. Any undue influence that  has  modified
the vote shall be detectable,”
while 16 requires:
“The voter shall receive confirmation by the system that the vote has been
cast successfully and that the whole voting procedure has been completed.”
And 17 finally asks:
“The e-voting system shall provide sound evidence that each authentic vote
is accurately included in the respective election results. The evidence should
be verifiable by means that are independent from the e-voting system.”
As the explanatory  notes  show,  a chain  of trust  must  be  established.
Individual verifiability  by the voter,  as demanded by explanatory note 55,
cannot exist in a postal voting regime where ballots are sent to the Election
Authority by non-registered mail and in envelopes, which must not carry
the address of the voter. So it is also impossible to tell whether a ballot from
an individual  voter  arrived  and  was  cast  and  counted,  let  alone
the detection of unlawful alterations. The current postal voting in Germany
is like a letter in a bottle, thrown into the sea: Once the voter put his or her
envelope into the post box, no one can tell whether it arrived and whether it
25 Heiner  Geißler,  former  chairman  and  long-term  Member  of Parliament  of the German
Christian  Democratic  Party  died in his  88th year  on 12  September  2017,  12  days  before
Election Day. He is likely to have voted by postal voting with his vote being counted.
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was counted or not. As the repealed Austrian Presidential Elections of 2016
have  shown,  irregularities  do  occur  even  in the Electoral  Commissions
when  opening  the envelopes  with  the postal  ballots  and  counting.26
The requirement that any undue influence shall be detectable, does not fully
apply to postal  voting.  As Schreiber  et al. pointed out,  election  authorities
in Germany  do  not  even  check  whether  incoming  postal  ballots  match
postal ballots sent to voters27 and all documents can easily be copied and/or
modified.28
2.4 SECRET SUFFRAGE
Standard 19 is an obvious necessity; nevertheless, it can easily be violated
when postal voting from overseas voters occurs. It states that
“the secrecy of the vote is respected at all stages of the voting procedures.” 
As Pautsch and Müller-Török have shown, jurisdiction of e.g. the US Supreme
Court  is  not  compatible  with  this  (European)  standard.  In United  States
vs. Ramsey, the court ruled regarding the opening and searching of post sent
to Ramsey from abroad:
“[…] That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right
of the sovereign  to protect  itself  by stopping  and  examining  persons  and
property  crossing  into  this  country,  are  reasonable  simply  by virtue
of the fact that they occur at the border should, by now, require no extended
demonstration.“29
And with even more clarity in the same case:
“Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
have been considered to be “reasonable” by the single fact that  the person
or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There has
never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border
search  depended  on the existence  of probable  cause.  This  longstanding
26 Verfassungsgerichtshof,  V  85-96/11-15,  13  December  2011.  [online] Available  from:
https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_V_85-96-11_e-voting.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2018].
27 Schreiber, W.; Hahlen, J. and Strelen, K.-L. (2017) BWahlG Kommentar zum Bundeswahlgesetz
unter Einbeziehung des Wahlprüfungsgesetzes,  des Wahlstatistikgesetzes, der Bundeswahlordnung
und sonstiger wahlrechtlicher Nebenvorschriften. 10., vollständig neubearbeitete Auflage. Carl
Heymanns Verlag, p. 613.
28 Ibid.
29 United States vs. Ramsey (1977) 431 U.S. 606.
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recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without
a warrant  are  nonetheless  “reasonable”  has  a history  as old  as the Fourth
Amendment itself.“30
This  standard  can  be  obeyed  to  in an e-voting  environment,  where
encryption by e.g. TLS/SSL hinders U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Customs
and Border Protection and other agencies to open and search the e-voting
ballot,31 but no one can hinder the before mentioned agencies to open and
search  postal  voting  ballots  for  contraband,  such  breaking  the secrecy
of the vote. Collecting all  postal votes from the US at a German consulate
and sending it  to Germany with diplomatic mail seems not to be a viable
option.
Setting  aside  the lawful  interception  of postal  voting  documents,
of course  Secret  Suffrage  can  be  breached  illegally,  e.g. by opening
the envelopes and closing them again. In the former GDR the State Security
Service (“Staatssicherheit” or short  “Stasi”) opened nearly each letter to and
from  abroad,  read  it  and  closed  it  in a manner  which  nearly  perfectly
camouflaged the fact  that  it  had been opened.32 A postal  ballot  does not
have  sufficient  precautions  against  such  measures.  Even  if it  were  not
possible to close it again, the vote would be lost – that the voter cannot learn
that his or her vote was lost seems to be an obvious violation of standard 15,
namely:
“The voter  shall  be  able  to verify  that  his  or her  intention  is  accurately
represented  in the vote  and that  the sealed  vote  has  entered the electronic
ballot  box without  being altered. Any undue influence that  has  modified
the vote shall be detectable.”
30 Ibid.
31 In this paper the author lets aside the issues associated with more restrictive internet usage
regimes  like  e.g. The Great  Firewall  of China  (see  Bloomberg.  (2018)  The  Great  Firewall
of China.  6  November.  [online]  Available  from:  https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/
great-firewall-of-china [Accessed 4 November 2018]).
32 For  an introduction  and  legal  documents  of the GDR  regarding  this  practice  see
the websites  of the Federal  Agency  for  Civic  Education  regarding  the regular  checks
of postal  shipments  by the State  Security  Service  (Allwissenheit  als  Ziel –  Die Postkontrolle
der DDR-Geheimpolizei.  [online]  Available  from:  http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-
geschichte/stasi/223937/postkontrolle  [as per 1  September  2018])  and  of the Federal
Commissioner  for  the Records  of the State  Security  Service  of the former  German
Democratic  Republic  (Das Recht  auf  Postgeheimnis.  [online]  Available  from:
https://www.demokratie-statt-diktatur.de/DSD/DE/Postgeheimnis/Aus-dem-Archiv/_node.
html [as per 1 September 2018]).
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This postal voting also creates another conflict with standard 19: When
posting the postal ballot into a post box, at least the following parties are
able to intercept the vote:
● The person collecting the post from the box, in specific boroughs
you may assume tendencies,  so e.g. a conservative or nationalist
postal  worker  could  throw  away  postal  ballots  in a borough,
which  traditionally  votes  for  communist,  socialist  or ecological
parties.  Since  the envelope  does  not  bear  a sender’s  address
in Germany and since the posting is not documented, there is no
way to even detect this offence;
● Any  other  postal  worker  from  the collection  to the delivery,
a number likely to be in the two-digit-range;
● Sorting machines could probably open or destroy postal ballots
by mistake or, probably the worst case, leave them undelivered
because of an assumed or real lack of sufficient franking;
● Staff  at the election  authority  could  make  a broad  variety
of mistakes  as the landmark  case  regarding  Austrian
Presidential Elections has shown, e.g.
◦ Non-members  of the election  authority  opened  envelopes
and took out the ballots;33
◦ Non-members  of the election  authority  decided  whether
ballots were invalid.34 They could at least theoretically, have
invalidated  them  on their  own,  as the Constitutional  Court
argued;35
● The person  who  receives  the postal  ballots  from  the postal
 services  on behalf  of the election  authority  could  destroy  them
 or hide them away. Since  there is  neither a closed and reliable
 chain of trust, nor even some paper-based protocol requirements,
 the likelihood of detection is quite low.
33 Verfassungsgerichtshof, W I 6/2016‐125, 1 July 2016. [online] Available from: https://www.ris.
bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Vfgh/JFT_20160701_16W_I00006_00/JFT_20160701_16W_I00006_
00.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2018]; RZ 201, 202 and 217 and several others.
34 Ibid, RZ 233 and 234.
35 Ibid, RZ 237 and 238; the whole ruling has 175 pages and the two illegal practices occurred
many time in many constituencies, hence only a few were quoted here. 
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2.5 REGULATORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
At the first glance, postal voting fulfils the standards of this section. A closer
analysis however shows, a conflict occurs with standard 29:
“The relevant  legislation  shall  regulate  the responsibilities  for
the functioning  of e-voting  systems  and  ensure  that  the electoral
management body has control over them.”
As explanatory note 88 shows:
“member States not to be dependent on just a few vendors since this could
result in a vendor-lock-in.”
A vendor-lock-in,  as described  by literature36 is  when  a customer,  in this
context an election authority, is fully dependent on a vendor. This vendor
is, with respect to postal voting, the Deutsche Post AG (together with many
smaller  postal  services  providers)  which  cannot  be  monitored  nor
controlled  by election  authorities  and  also,  at a later  stage,  courts.
The explanatory note 88 becomes even more concrete and states:
“When  considering  outsourcing,  it  is  essential  that  those  who  are
responsible for the elections understand what is being outsourced, why it is
being  outsourced  and  what  methods  and  processes  the vendor  intends
to undertake.”
Explanatory note 87 adds:
“It is recommended that the relevant legislation provides for the supervisory
role  of the electoral  management  body  over  e-voting.  The role  and
the responsibilities  of the other  parties  involved  should  be  clarified
at the appropriate regulatory or contractual level.”
As shown  above  in the section  regarding  secret  suffrage,  foreign  postal
services  are impossible  to be controlled by the Election Authorities.  If  we
take e.g. the delivery times,  Pautsch and Müller-Török have shown that they
36 Liebowitz, S. J.; Margolis, Stephen E. (1995) Path dependence, lock-in and history . Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization. 11, p. 205–226.
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are beyond any national control37 and it is obvious that no regulation nor
contract other than the Convention union postale universelle38 exists. 
2.6 TRANSPARENCY AND OBSERVATION
Transparency  is  an issue  from  the time  the postal  voter  drops  his  or her
ballot  into  the mailbox.  From here  on absolutely  no  transparency  exists,
because:
● The envelope  bears  no  sender  in German  postal  voting,  hence
a totally  anonymous  vote  is  being  transferred  (or not)  totally
untracked to the respective  Election  Authority  and no  one  can
ever tell whether it arrived, was counted etc.;
● Unlike  e.g. registered  mail  or parcels,  which  can  be  tracked
via the Internet, the postal ballot cannot be tracked.
Explanatory note no. 91 is violated, which states:
“In particular  system’s  transparency,  or the possibility  to check  that  it  is
functioning properly, must be guaranteed. Member States regulate who has
access to what and when and under what circumstances.”
The national – and much more the foreign – postal authorities are neither
transparent  nor  can  anyone  guarantee  their  proper  functioning.  Recent
newspaper reports show that the Deutsche Post AG decided to introduce
other days other than Sundays where no mail is delivered. If such causes
a loss  of a handful  of ballots,  the outcome  of elections  can  be  changed
as e.g. in 2013  a narrow  constituency  for  German  Parliament,  Märkischer
Kreis II was won by a margin of 53 votes – or 27 ballots would have made
a change.39
2.7 ACCOUNTABILITY
These standards are obviously focused on e-voting, but if applied to postal
voting,  it  becomes  obvious  that  their  underlying  principles  are  violated
by postal voting practice. If we take standard 37, it states:
37 Pautsch,  A.  and  Müller-Török,  R.  (2015)  Die grenzüberschreitende  Zustellung
von Briefwahlunterlagen  vor den Schranken  des Völkerrechts –  Eine  übersehene
Problematik?. Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, 3, pp. 88–90, p. 90.
38 Convention union postale universelle. [online] Available from: http://www.upu.int/fr/lupu/
actes/actes-en-trois-volumes.html [Accessed 4 November 2018].
39 Der Bundeswahlleiter.  (2014) Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 22. 9.  2013, Heft  5, Teil  1,
Textliche Auswertung Wahlergebnisse, p. 69, anhangtabelle 1.
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“Before  an e-voting  system  is  introduced  and  at appropriate  intervals
thereafter,  and  in particular  after  any  significant  changes  are  made
to the system,  an independent  and  competent  body  shall  evaluate
the compliance  of the e-voting  system  and  of any  information  and
communication  technology  (ICT)  component  with  the  technical
requirements.  This  may  take  the form  of formal  certification  or other
appropriate control.”
Who  certified  postal  services?  In the recent  years,  not  only  the formerly
state-operated Deutsche Bundespost was transferred into a stock-exchange-
-listed entity Deutsche Post AG but also new, mostly local, postal service
providers  were  founded.  Some  of them  went  bankrupt  at short  notice,
e.g. RegioPost  Pfalz  GmbH that stopped postal  services  in February 2018
and told some 500 staff on 19 January 2018 that they are laid off with effect
from 20 January 2018.40 If this were in the six weeks before a Parliamentary
Election Day, irregularities would surely have occurred in postal voting. It
seems notable in this context that nowadays mail, including postal ballots,
is  not  handled  by sworn  officers  like  in the days  of the Deutsche
Bundespost  but  by low-paid staff  in sub entities  of the Deutsche Post AG
with significantly lower wages.41 This seems to be an international trend.42
Schreiber  et al. heavily  criticized  the privatization  of postal  services
in the context of postal voting.43
Another standard is 39, the requirement for auditability, namely:
“The audit system shall [...] actively report on potential issues and threats.”
It is obvious that this requirement is not fulfilled by any paper-based postal
system. No post box actively reports when it is damaged or shipments are
40 Karin  Hurrle.  (2018)  Müssen  entlassene  Mitarbeiter  nun  wieder  die Zeche  für
ein Missmanagement  zahlen?  Nachrichten  Regional, 23  January.  [online] Available  from:
https://www.nachrichten-regional.de/index.php/%C3%BCberregional/6733-regio-post-pfalz
-und-regio-post-beteiligungsgesellschaft-ein-undurchsichtiges-konstrukt.html
[Accessed 4 November 2018].
41 Spiegel  Online.  (2018) Zusteller  der Deutschen  Post  sollen  in neuen  Betrieb  ausgelagert
werden.  12  March.  [online]  Available  from:  https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/
unternehmen/deutsche-post-zusteller-sollen-in-neuen-betrieb-ausgelagert-werden-a-
1197588.html
42 See e.g. The Telegraph. (2017) Threat of Royal Mail Strike Lessens as Progress Made in Union
Talks. 6 December. [online] Available from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/12/
06/threat-royal-mail-strike-lessens-progress-made-union-talks/
43 Schreiber, W.; Hahlen, J. and Strelen, K.-L. (2017) BWahlG Kommentar zum Bundeswahlgesetz
unter Einbeziehung des Wahlprüfungsgesetzes,  des Wahlstatistikgesetzes, der Bundeswahlordnung
und sonstiger wahlrechtlicher Nebenvorschriften. 10., vollständig neubearbeitete Auflage. Carl
Heymanns Verlag, p. 613.
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stolen out of it.  No one can tell  whether envelopes with postal votes are
fished  out  of a post  box,  at least  at the present  technological  standards
in Germany. If we compare this to explanatory note 114, it is obvious that
no Intrusion Detection System exists for postal services and that, hopefully,
for registered mail, no audit trails exist as required by explanatory note 115.
Explanatory note 118, which requires:
“observers should be able to see the total number of ballots cast in real time,
so that independent cross checks can be performed,”
cannot be fulfilled by a postal service based on post boxes, manual transport
with trucks and no electronic tracking system  at all. Concerning the other
explanatory notes, we must state that none of these audit requirements can
be met by postal voting. No postal system can detect voter fraud, as Isobel
White has shown for the UK.44
2.8 RELIABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE SYSTEM
With  respect  to reliability  and  security,  already  the first  standard  no. 40
cannot be fulfilled by postal voting:
“The electoral management body shall be responsible for the respect for and
compliance with all requirements even in the case of failures and attacks.”
This  would  mean  that  election  authorities  are  in charge  of all  involved
postal services used – even of the postal services in Thailand or Argentine,
if a voter  cast  his  or her  ballot  there.  Access  to central  infrastructure
(of postal  services  worldwide)  cannot  be  granted  to persons  “authorised
by the electoral  management  body” as standard  41  requests.  Also,  among
others, standard 47 is impossible to fulfil, namely:
“Where incidents that could threaten the integrity of the system occur, those
responsible  for  operating  the equipment  shall  immediately  inform
the electoral management body.”
would  require  the e.g. Argentine  postal  service  to report  to (German)
election authorities when a bag of shipments is stolen, which could contain
ballots for German elections.  Moreover, finally  standard 49 is  impossible
44 White,  I.  and  Coleman,  Ch.  (2011)  Postal  Voting  & Electoral  Fraud,  SN/PC/3667,  House
of Commons  Library;  White,  I.  (2015)  Electoral  Offences  since  2010,  House  of Commons
Library Briefing Paper Number 625.
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to be  fulfilled  by postal  voting:  Identifying  votes  that  are  affected
by irregularities. 
3. IMMEDIATE CHANGES NECESSARY FOR GERMAN 
POSTAL VOTING
With a view to the section above the following changes seem unavoidable
necessities in order to comply with essential principles of voting:
1. Introduction  of either  a centralized  German  voter  registry
or automatic  reconciliation  of the decentralized  registers
to ensure effectively that  no identity twin nor double-registered
voter occurs. This registry must also be able to deal with people
dying after having applied for postal ballots etc.;
2. Sending  postal  ballots  to the voter  by registered  mail  only  with
a mandatory  and  high  profile  proof  of identity,45 thereby
hindering bogus applications and theft of ballots;46
3. A mechanism  shall  be  established  where  a voter  may  verify
whether  his  or her  vote  actually  arrived  with  the Election
Authorities  and  entered  the ballot  box.  This  mechanism  must
guarantee anonymity;
4. Regarding  overseas  voters,  the timelines  and  the whole  legal
framework  must  be  reengineered  according
to the recommendations  of  Pautsch  and  Müller-Török.  The risk
that  any  other  authoritarian  state  manipulates  the cornerstone
of German  democracy  is  far  too  high  with  some  2  million
German  voters  living  abroad.  If we  take  e.g. the preliminary
results  of the latest  election  in Germany,  the one  for  the State
Assembly  of the Federal  State  of Hesse  on October  28,  2018,
the race  for  the second  place  between  Social  Democrats  and
Green  Party  was  decided  by a margin  of 94  votes.47 If only  47
ballots were different, it would have been a tie. 
45 The author was handed a letter sent by registered mail  today (October 16th, 2018) when
opening the door w/o any proof of identity. The “signature” required consisted of “signing
his name” with his pointing finger on a mobile device, some kind of touchpad. It is obvious
that such a “signature” will not be highly valued in a Constitutional Court.
46 Such offences are common in e.g. the UK as shown by White and Coleman (p. 20) and White
(see fn. 44). Unfortunately comparable statistics are not available for Germany. 
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These measures cannot hinder third parties, e.g. spouses to steal postal
ballots  or violently  force  the voter  to cast  his  or her  vote.48 Because
a mechanism  like  a replacing  vote,  which  can  be  implemented
in an e-voting system, cannot be implemented in postal voting, this risk still
exists. 
4. RESUME
To summarize, the current German (and other) regime of postal voting has
one big issue, which seems to be totally underestimated regarding its effect
on election results:
Once  the election  authority  sends  the postal  ballot  to an address
(hopefully  the address  of the voter),  it  totally  loses  any  control  until
the ballot returns. In the meantime, which means within a period of several
weeks,  the following  persons/entities  could  have  corrupted  the ballot,
by stealing, forging, casting their own vote on behalf of the voter etc.:
1. Postal  services  and  their  employees  of Germany  and  all  other
countries affected;
2. State  agencies  like  the above-mentioned  US  Customs  and  US
Postal Inspectors but, in our days, also rogue states which want
to manipulate  German  elections  by manipulating  the ballots
of imprisoned German citizens;
3. Individuals,  including  neighbours,  relatives  and  spouses  who
intercept  ballots  or use  force  to make  the voter  cast  his  or her
vote in violation of voting principles.
The major  problem,  according  to the literature,  the political  discussion
and  discussions  with  fellow  scientists  and  election  practitioners  is  that
postal  voting  once  was  the rare  exception,  when  being  abroad,  ill  etc.
Nowadays  it  has  become  a way  of “convenience  voting”,  which  frees
47 Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt. (2018)  Statistische Berichte, Kennziffer B VII 2-3 – 5j/18,
Die Landtagswahl in Hessen am 28. Oktober 2018, Vorläufige Ergebnisse. [online] Available from:
https://statistik.hessen.de/sites/statistik.hessen.de/files/BVII2-3_5j18.pdf
[Accessed  2 November  2018],  p. 12;  it  is  notable  that  the final  result  is  not  available
on 9 November 2018 due to irregularities, mistakes and necessary recounts. The final result
is  expected  for  16  November  2018  (see Die  Welt. (2018)  Es  gab  eine  Reihe
von Übermittlungs-  und  Eingabefehlern.  9 November.  [online] Available  from:
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article183584926/Landtagswahl-Hessen-2018-So-
erklaert-der-Wahlleiter-die-Auszaehlungspanne.html [Accessed 9 November 2018]).
48 White,  I.  and  Coleman,  Ch.  (2011)  Postal  Voting  & Electoral  Fraud,  SN/PC/3667,  House
of Commons Library, pp. 18, 27 and 33.
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the voter  from the perceived  burden of appearing  in person at the polling
station.  From 1994 to 2017 the share  of postal  voters  at the parliamentary
elections  in Germany  has  more  than  doubled  and  stands  at 28.6 percent
with  Hamburg  and  Bavaria  leading  the way  with  37.0  and  37.3 percent
respectively.49 If you take e.g. the Federal State of Hamburg, it is a city with
984,926 votes  cast  out  of approx.  1.8 Mio.  inhabitants  occupying  some
755 square  kilometres,  hence  it  seems  unreproducible  that  364,213 postal
voters  were  sick,  disabled,  abroad  or in a comparable  situation  which
hindered them to appear in person at the polling station.50 
The major thing to do now is to start a serious scientific discussion about
these  issues.  As shown  above,  the issues  exist  but  unfortunately  not
the scientific publications dealing with them. So the first duty of the Social
Sciences would be to provide a sound basis for a political discussion. This
contribution is intended to be a stimulus starting a discussion.
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